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COMMENTS

FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER RICO: AN
AFFRONT TO A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
AND TO A FAIR TRIAL
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1986, an eighteen member President's Commission on Organized Crime released a staggering report revealing the colossal monster that organized crime has become.1 With vengeance almost personal,' prosecutors have issued a large number of indictments
leading to numerous important convictions. 3 Their successes can, for
the most part, be attributed to what has been called the "thermonuclear device of criminal statutes":" Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970,6 entitled Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO).
Empowered by 1984 amendments to RICO,6 prosecutors are able
to attack the major crime bosses by depriving them of effective counsel 7
I. Lacayo, The Thermonuclear Statute, TIME, April 14, 1986, at 82 (organized crime is
expected to take in approximately $106 billion and cost the average American more than $77.22
in 1986).
2. Magnuson, Hitting the Mafia, TIME, Sept. 29, 1986, at 16. Rudolph Giuliani, the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, promised that "[tihe Mafia will be
crushed." Id. at 19.
3. See id.
4. See Lacayo, supra note 1, at 82 (quoting Stephen Troft, head of the Justice Department's criminal division).
5. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 922, 941 (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-68 (1982)).
6. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837
(1984) (amending RICO primarily to codify the result in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16
(1983)(discussed infra text accompanying note 46). Recognizing that the original provision of
RICO did not have the desired effectiveness, Congress sought to reinforce the statute by attacking
the life blood of organized crime:
What is needed here ... are new approaches that will deal not only with individuals, but
also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious
threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their
source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts.
S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. at 79 (1969).
7. After the report of the President's Commission on Organized Crime, many defense attorneys are now being seen in the same light as their clients. See McDaniel, Mob Defenders: As
Corrupt as Their Clients?, 71 A.B.A.J. July, 1985, at 32. (viewing them as Consiglioris, prosecutors are now attempting to curb a defense attorney's ability to effectively represent his client by
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through forfeiture of attorneys' fees." Although court orders for forfeiture of illegally obtained assets are not a recent development, the 1984
amendments extend forfeiture to assets transferred to third parties,
which has aroused the ire of defense attorneys who suddenly have
found themselves and their fees targets of forfeiture actions.' As a result, many defense attorneys are refusing to represent RICO defend-

ants.10 In addition to providing for forfeiture of transferred assets, Congress stocked more explosive power into the prosecutorial arsenal by
allowing the courts to issue pretrial, and even pre-indictment, restraining orders that prevent disposal of assets which may later be
found subject to forfeiture." The government can freeze assets already

transferred as compensation to attorneys.

2

A crisis of potential consti-

tutional significance arises when a court restrains all of a defendant's
assets, thereby lowering his financial "status [to that] of a 'pauper' "IS
4
and leaving him unable to retain counsel of his choice. Although

obtaining client identity and fee arrangements to establish unexplained wealth).
8. The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, passed in 1984 as part of The Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984 (CCCA), permits forfeiture of any property constituting, or derived from, the
proceeds of racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection as prohibited by section 1962. See 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (Supp. I1 1986). Attorneys are affected by section 1963(c), which states
that the government's interest in tainted property vests at the time of the illegal act and is not
extinguishable by virtue of its subsequent transfer to a third party. Id. § 1963(c).
Criminal forfeiture can also be found in 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982)(entitled "Continuing Criminal Enterprise"). Section 848 was passed to combat drug trafficking and encompasses Title Ii of
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 408, 84
Stat. 1265. Like RICO, section 848 forfeiture provisions were amended under the CFA. See 21
U.S.C. § 853 (Supp. III 1986). As modified, the wording of the respective statutes virtually mirror
one another and were intended to be interpreted similarly by Congress. See S. REP. No. 98-225,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, 210, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3182, 3393. For
an examination of the subtle differences see D. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES § 13.02 (1986).
9. See D. SMITH, supra note 8, § 13.04(3). See also Frank, Are Federal Subpoenas Subject
to State Rules?, 72 A.B.A.J., March I, 1986, at 32 (A study by William Genego concluded that
the percentage of RICO cases in which lawyers received grand jury subpoenas increased from
18% in 1980 through 1982 to 68% in 1983 through 1985).
10. Chambers, Criminal Lawyers in Study Say New Laws Inhibit Case Choices, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 21, 1985, at A20, col. I (attorneys are afraid not only of losing fees, but also of being
targets themselves of "undercover" operations).
I1. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e) (Supp. Il11986). A pretrial restraining order effectively
freezes defendant's assets and is premised on the fear that the restrainee will dispose of assets by
hiding or transferring them to a third party if the government does not freeze them. For this
reason the government targets the fees paid to attorneys. See Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys'
Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. LAW REV. 493,
496 n.16 (1986).
12. See id. (the attorney essentially holds the assets in an equitable trust for the government
while the trial proceeds).
13. United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1326 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 106 S. Ct. 406
(interim ed. 1985).
14. See id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss3/4
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many courts and commentators contend that sixth amendment rights to
counsel are not sacrificed since the now indigent defendant qualifies for
court-appointed counsel, representation by inexperienced public defenders has been criticized as ineffective and inadequate for the task of a
RICO defense.15 Defense attorneys who accept RICO cases must concern themselves both with defending their client 6 and protecting their
own fees. 7

15. Criticism here stems from the fact that RICO cases often involve a considerable amount
of time, money, and expertise due to the complexity of the issues. See United States v. Rogers,
602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985) "Adequate defense of RICO cases generally requires representation during grand jury investigations lasting as long as two or three years. Counsel appointed
ninety to one hundred days before trials is patently inadequate." Id. at 1349-50. For an of a
example a complex RICO prosecution see United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied 457 U.S. 1136, 459 U.S. 906 (1982). "The magnitude of the effort required by this
Court for careful review of appellant's contentions is reflected both by the size of the record-more than 80 volumes containing some 12,000 pages of trial transcript and some 3,000
pages in the volumes of pleadings .
I..."
Id. at 985-86 n.4.
Some commentators argue that only highly skilled defense attorneys can provide effective
RICO defenses and that the public defender system is inadequate.
Replacing the privately retained counsel with the conveniently appointed lawyer from the
Public Defender's Office is not a substitution in kind. The accomplishments and capabilities
of Public Defenders offices throughout the country have been, and continue to be, extraordinary. However, they were never designed to replace the private lawyer. The judges
that may be inclined to think the substitution is acceptable would not go to a local outpatient unit or community clinic for an arterial [sic] bypass if a heart specialist was available.
Krieger and Van Dusen, The Lawyer. The Client and the New Law, 22 AM. CRIM. LAw REV. 737,
739-40 (1985)(footnote omitted).
Critics are also concerned with the effect that the substitution will have on the public defender system. Bamberger, Prosecutors' Actions are Weakening the Public Defender System,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1985, at 30, col. 3 (letter to the editor)("[A]nnual budgets allocated to
Federal [public] defender offices are inadequate to pay for the lawyers and other resources necessary to handle the massive litigation practice involved in [RICO] cases.").
16. Courts and commentators alike are worried about conflict of interest problems between
the attorney and his client, contending that attorneys will urge clients to accept plea bargains in
which the offense pled guilty to is one to which forfeiture is inapplicable. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 15, at
741. In addition, the "wait and see" attitude of a RICO defense attorney almost makes his compensation a "contingent fee," which is frowned upon in criminal defense work. See MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(c) (1983); cf.United v. Basset, 632 F. Supp.
1308,
1316-17 n.5 (D. Md. 1986)(defense counsel argued with approval by the court that, if they represented these defendants, they would be violating attorney ethics rules).
17. Under section 1963(m) of title 18 of the United States Code, a post-conviction hearing
may be held to determine the claims of third parties asserting an interest in forfeited property.
The government must give notice of its intent to dispose of forfeited property by publication or
direct notice to interested parties to which such interested third parties must respond within thirty
days. At the hearing, the petitioner has the burden of proving either that at the time of the acts
giving rise to forfeiture, his interest in the property was superior to that of the defendant, or that
he is a "bona fide purchaser" who had no reason to believe the property was subject to forfeiture.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (Supp. III 1986).
It is extremely difficult for the defendant's attorney to argue that he is a "bona fide purchaser" and entitled to keep his fees, since both the restraining order and the very nature of
defending an alleged criminal
Published by eCommons, 1986make questionable any assertions by an attorney that he did not
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Some argue that the forfeiture statutes raise serious constitutional
questions by "eliminat[ing] the adversary from the adversary process"' 8 and giving the government the "ultimate tactical advantage of
19
being able to exclude competent defense counsel as it chooses."' At
stake is one of the core features of our criminal justice system: a de2
fense counsel's independence in pleading his client's case. "
Supporters of the forfeiture statutes respond that just as a criminal
cannot be permitted to retain a "Rolls-Royce with the fruits of a crime,
he cannot be permitted to obtain the services of Rolls-Royce of the
attorneys from these same tainted funds." 2 The government further
contends that incarceration alone cannot combat racketeering activity
and that forfeiture of criminal assets, even attorney's fees, is necessary
to prevent the illegal funds from being passed on to benefit the criminal
enterprise.22
Attacking the economic base of organized crime is surely is one
valid way to attack the problem. However, "ours is a society which has
always looked to values beyond efficiency in bringing wrongdoers to the
bar of justice."2 Although Congress has given prosecutors a tool to
combat organized crime, Congress is not the final arbiter of what is
constitutional. Naturally, a defendant should not be able to use his illgotten gain to obtain top legal counsel; however, "[olur system of justice thrives on the adversary system, the presumption of innocence and
24
'
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of legal counsel."
The defendant, who is presumed to be innocent, must be able to use his
presumed-to-be legal funds to provide for the defense to which he has a
constitutional right. Forfeiture of attorneys fee's tips the scales of justice in the government's favor. In sum, freezing the defendant's assets
will chill his constitutional right to a balance of forces between the
5
prosecutor and defense counsel and his right to counsel of his choice.

believe his client's property was subject to forfeiture.
18. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985).
19. Id. (forfeiture hurts the adversary system in that the most skilled lawyer cannot participate). But see Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839, 853 n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rejecting
the Rogers court's contention that appointed counsel could not provide adequate representation).
20. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (preliminary printing 1984); United
States v. Defalco, 644 F.2d 132, 136 (3d Cir. 1979) ("If there is any constraint on counsel's
complete and exuberant presentation, our system will fail because the basic ingredient of the adversary system will be missing.").
21. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14.
22. See id.
23. Note, Conspiracy, Concealment and the Statute of Limitations, 70 YALE L.J. 1311,
1353 (1961).
24. Moscarino, Are Prosecutors Invading the Attorney-Client Relationship?, 71 A.B.A.J.
Sept. 1985, at 38, 39-40.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss3/4
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This comment addresses this potential imbalance in the adversarial system by first exploring the history and nature of criminal for-

feiture. It then focuses on the fifth and sixth amendment concerns

raised by the amended forfeiture provisions. Finally, suggestions that
have been offered to alleviate the constitutional concerns will be
discussed.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The History and Nature of Criminal Forfeiture

Criminal forfeiture is of ancient origin; it is mentioned in the Old
Testament of the Bible. 6 For Centuries, English law has mandated
that traitors and felons forfeit all property to the crown or to the local
lord.2" Yet English law also recognized that this sovereign power had
its limits. 8
Criminal forfeiture was initially opposed in revolutionary
America. 9 However, in rem forfeitures have long been available in the
civil context."0 Provided as a security to increase executive enforcement
of Congressional mandates, 3 1 civil in rem forfeitures operate against
the property itself. 2
(1973); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 722-26 (1969)(chilling effect doctrine).

26. "if an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, then the ox shall surely be stoned."
Exodus 21:28-29, quoted in COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984, at 365 (K. Feinberg
& S. Schreiber co-chairman 1985)[hereinafter Feinberg].
27. Id. at 366. According to Blackstone, the rational for criminal forfeiture was that the
criminal
who hath thus violated the fundamental principles of government, and broken his part
of the original contract between the king and people, hath abandoned his connetions with
society; hath no longer any right to the advantages, which before belonged to him purely as
a member of the community: among which social advantages the right of transferring or
transmitting property to others ...
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 375 (reprint 1966). A more practical motivation behind forfeiture is simply that acquiring criminal assets is extremely profitable for the government. Former
Senator Jeremiah Denton (R - Ala.) once opined that with adequate forfeiture laws, "[w]e could
balance the budget." Note, A Proposalto Reform CriminalForfeiture Under RICO and CCE, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1929, 1932 n.13 (1984).
28. See Feinberg, supra note 26, at 366 (the hesitation regarding use of forfeiture extends
back to the adoption of the Magna Carte).
29. "[T]he Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
attainted." U.S. CONST. art Ill, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
30. See D. SMITH, supra note 8, § 13.01; see also Brickey, supra note II, at 493 n.l ("The
use of in rem civil forfeiture proceedings to reach crime-related property is, however, a well established custom in American jurisprudence.") (citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827)).
31. Reed, Criminal Forfeiture under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Raising
the Stakes, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 747, 747-48 (1985).
32. Actions in rem concern only the property and proceeds without mention of the owner.
Therefore, the owner of the property in such cases has few substantive safeguards. The government need
only show probable
Published
by eCommons,
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Forfeiture in the criminal context was integrated into the Ameri3
can legal system with the adoption of RICO in 1970. 3 In contrast to
civil in rem forfeiture, criminal forfeiture under RICO is conducted in
personam.3 ' Because of the harshness of the penalty to the individual,

35
the level of scrutiny afforded in a criminal forfeiture case is strict.

Under RICO, the question of forfeiture is inextricably linked with that
of a defendant's guilt; before the defendant is forced to transfer his
assets to the government, the jury must find not only that the defendant is guilty of violating a RICO provision, but also that the property
at issue is related to the statutory violation." The property subject to

forfeiture must be related to a specific statutory violation; so forfeiture,
while viewed as a punishment, is not, strictly speaking, a fine." In contrast to the English view of forfeiture of an entire estate upon convic8

tion,

section 1963 of RICO limits forfeiture to property that the de-

39
fendant acquired as a result of his racketeering activity.

The 1970 adoption of in personam forfeiture provided a novel eco-

nomic approach to criminal prosecution.' Although the statute was in-

42
terpreted broadly,"' it failed to meet the expectations of Congress. To
reinforce the original goals of RICO, the 98th Congress passed the

Comprehensive Forfeiture Act (CFA), chapter III of the Comprehen-

supra note 8, at § 13.01. Forfeiture in rem is not dependent on an adjudication of personal
guilt. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-84 (1974).
33. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 922, 941
(codified as 18 U.S.C § 1963-1968 (1982)).
34. United States v. Ginsberg, 773 F.2d 798, 800-01 (7th Cir. 1985).
35. Id.; United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324 (8th Cir. 1985) (in personam actions
require more careful consideration of due process than those in rem).
36. See D. SMITH, supra note 8, § 13.01 (citing United States Attorney General's Brief in
Opposition to Defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiori, Cauble v. United States, 706 F.2d 1322
(5th Cir. 1983)(No. 83-85), cert. denied., 104 S. Ct 996 (1984)).
37. Garret v. United States, 105 S. Ct 2407, 2419-20 (1985) (overruling United States v.
Conner, 752 F.2d 566 (1 Ith Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 72 (interim ed. 1985)) (the court in
Garret could not trace illegal funds to any identifiable assets but nevertheless substituted otherwise unforfeitable assets under CCE forfeiture).
38. See generally W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 27.
39. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., ist Sess. at 23 (1969).
40. See, e.g., Ginsberg, 773 F.2d at 802 (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970)(Congress' motivation in enacting RICO was
"to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by ... establishing new remedies
to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.")) Id.
41. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576 (1981).
42. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE Asset Forfeiture: A Seldom Used Tool in Combatting
Drug Trafficking (1981). The GAO found that the major reasons for failure of the forfeiture
statutes were complacent attempts by prosecutors pursuing forfeiture, and ambiguities and limitations in the 1970 statute. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 191-92, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3374-75; see also Reed, supra note 31, at 749 (because Congress
provided little procedural guidance, courts had to develop their own rules of procedure).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss3/4
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sive Crime Control Act of 1984,"' to eliminate the obstacles and frustrations being experienced by prosecutors."
B.

The 1984 Statute: Substance and Procedure

The 1984 Congressional amendments expanded greatly the substantive aspects of forfeiture by broadening the type of property subject
to forfeiture. The amendments expanded the procedural aspects of for-

feiture by increasing the government's ability to obtain forfeitures of

recovered property."8
In section 1963(a)(3), Congress provided for forfeiture of any
property constituting or derived from the proceeds of racketeering or
unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962, codifying the Supreme Court's ruling in Russello v. United States.4"

In section 1963(c), 4 7 Congress provided an even greater substantive change by increasing the amount of property subject to forfeiture
by limiting the "relation-back doctrine. ' 48 The relation-back doctrine,

borrowed from civil forfeiture, "9 permits the defendant to exclude an

asset from forfeiture by showing that the asset was derived from
sources which ante-dated the commission of the alleged criminal act

which gave rise to the forfeiture.5 0
The latter portion of section 1963(c). precludes any reaching attempts by a defendant to transfer illicit funds to a knowing third party
43. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 301-323, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040 (1984)(codified as amended in
scattered sections of tits. 18, 19, 21, 26, 28 U.S.C.).
44. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191-92, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3374-75.
45. FEINBERG supra note 26, at 367.
46. 464 U.S. 16 (1983), cited in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984 AND OTHER CRIMINAL STATUTES ENACTED BY THE 98TH
CONGRESS

43 (1984).

47.

Section 1963(c) states:
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in the United
States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section. Any such
property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than defendant may be the
subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the
United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (m)
that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this
section.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. 111 1986).
48. See Reed, supra note 31, at 752.
49. Id. The relation-back provision is based on the "doctrine of taint." See Colero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). Under this theory, property becomes "'tainted"
as soon as it is connected with illegal activity. However, in a pre-amendment case, the seventh
circuit rejected the "taint" theory in RICO cases. United States v. McManigal, 723 F.2d 580, 581
(7th Cir. 1983).
50. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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before conviction. 5 ' To "close a potential loophole in the RICO forfeiture provision, '"52 Congress, under section 1963(c), particularly
targeted attorneys and the fees they have received as compensation for

representing a defendant indicted under RICO.53 Before the 1984
amendment, there was increasing realization that attorneys were receiving unprecedented fees from their racketeer and drug-trafficking
clients. 54 Although few courts addressed the issue prior to passage of
the CFA, limited case law did support governmental efforts to obtain

attorneys' fees."
Under section 1963(c) transfers of tainted property are valid if the
56
transferee can prove that he is a "bona fide purchaser for value," that
he accepted the asset in good faith, and that he did not have reasonable

cause when the transfer occurred, to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture. Because of the nature of the relationship between a
defendant who has been charged under RICO and his attorney, proving
the second half of this test is difficult. As one court explained: "No one

is more on notice of likelihood that the money [transferred by the defendant to the attorney] may come from such prohibited activity than
is asked to represent the defendant in the trial of the
the lawyer who
57

indictment.

In addition to changes in substantive law, there were also consider-

51. Id.
52. S. REP. No.225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1983), reprinted in U.S. CODE & ADMIN.
NEWS, 3182, 3379, cited in United States v. laniello, 621 F. Supp. 1455, 1476 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("The problem of pre-conviction dispositions of property subject to criminal forfeiture is further
complicated by the question of whether, simply by transferring an asset to a third party, a defendant may shield it from forfeiture.").
53. See D. SMITH, supra note 8, § 13.04(1). The defense bar, for the most part, ignored
extension of forfeiture to transferred property in the pre-1984 cases. However, with the codification of this approach in the CFA, their complacency turned to outrage. id.
54. The most noteworthy case here is the Black Tuna Case reported under the name United
States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 459 U.S. 906
(1982). In Black Tuna, the court permitted three residences, obtained by the proceeds of drug
smuggling, to be sold to compensate the attorneys. In the end, the attorneys received $784,000 out
of the $800,000 produced from the sale. See Forfeitureof Narcotics Proceeds:Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1980), cited in Note, Criminal Forfeiture: Attacking the Economic Dimension of Organized
Narcotics Trafficking, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 242 nn.1 14-15 (1982).
55. See United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
133 (1984)(implied that attorneys' fees should not be dealt with any differently than other types
of third party transfers); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981 )(permitting a restraining order, prior to the indictment, on a $140,000 airplane transferred to defendant's attorney
as compensation for representation in the upcoming trial); United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp.
723 (S.D. Cal. 1979)(permitted a restraining order which froze all of defendant's assets premised
on the possibility that the attorneys fees might be found to be derived from defendants involvemnent in the enterprise).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. III 1986).
57. Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss3/4
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able procedural changes in the RICO forfeiture provisions. Before the
1984 amendments, courts wrestled with ways to prevent a defendant
from destroying, hiding, or transferring his assets before his assets were
held subject to forfeiture.5 8 The pre-1984 courts used general due process standards59 to supplement statutory procedures 0 in their attempts
to control defendants' assets.61 Many courts, sensitive to defendants'
property rights, required a full evidentiary hearing and proof "beyond a
reasonable doubt" before issuing a restraining order."2 In response,
some prosecutors resorted to seizing the property as evidence of the
crime or having the IRS seize the property through its "jeopardy and
termination assessment" procedure.6 3 Realizing that these remedies
were less than perfect, Congress provided prosecutors with a more ef64
fective method.
Section 1963(e) permits three different types of restraining orders:
post indictment, pre-indictment, and ex parte.65 While postindictment
restraining orders were available under the 1970 statute, 66 the amended
version considerably reduces the burden of proof on the government.6 7
Pre-indictment orders, although available only in certain situations,
had great potential to expand governmental jurisdiction over the defendant's assets. 68 Pre-indictment restraining orders are used when the
government wishes to prevent the accused, who has been advised of his
impending indictment, from transferring, concealing, or destroying his
assets.6 9 The government can extend this powerful hand, however, only

58.
59.
60.

See Reed, supra note 31, at 761.
Id.
The original restraining order provision of the 1970 statute provided:
In any action brought by the United States under this section, the district courts of the
United States shall have jurisdiction to enter restraining orders or prohibitions, or to take
any such other actions, including, but not limited to, the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture
under this section, as it shall deem proper.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1982).
61. Like an injunction, a restraining order prevents a defendant from doing a specified act
until a hearing can be completed. See BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 1181 (5th ed. 1979).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated on other
grounds. 104 S. Ct. 3575 (1984).
63. See D. SMITH, supra note 8, § 14.02.
64. Id.
65. 18 U.S.C. §1963(e) (Supp. Ii 1986).
66. See FEINBERG, supra note 26, at 370.
67. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(l)(A) (Supp. 1II 1986). The government merely has to allege
in the indictment that the property would be subject to forfeiture in the event of conviction. Id.
No hearing is therefore required. This overrules United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir.
1984).
68. See H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 204-21, 357-58 (1984).
69. Id.
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after notice has been given and a hearing held.7" At the hearing the
government must show that there is a substantial likelihood that the
United States will win the forfeiture issue, that failure to enter the
order would result in the property's being somehow unavailable for forfeiture," and that the need to preserve the availability of the asset outweighs the hardship to the defendant. 72 Pre-indictment restraining orders are limited to ninety days unless an indictment is filed or an
extension is granted by the court.13 Finally, the court can issue an ex
parte order. 74 An ex parte order is similar to a pre-indictment restraining order except that no notice or opportunity to be heard is
granted to the restrainee.7 5 The government must demonstrate to the
court probable cause that the property is subject to forfeiture and that
the provision of notice would jeopardize the availability of the property. 76 This temporary order, however, expires ten days after the date
upon which it is entered, unless lengthened by the court upon a showing of good cause.77
The restraining order amendments did not pass through Congress
without due process and right to counsel questions. 8 Critics saw a
threat to due process from lack of adequate notice and opportunity to
be heard. 9 Sixth amendment concerns arose with the recognition that
pre-trial restraining orders would reduce the defendant's net worth to
the status of constructive indigency, 8° causing him difficulty in obtaining counsel of choice. 8 Congress anticipated this problem by simply stating that "nothing in this section is intended to interfere with a
person's Sixth Amendment rights to counsel."8 " However, they failed to

70. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(l)(B) (Supp. III 1986).
71. Id. § 1963(e)(I)(B)(i).
72. Id. § 1963(e)(I)(B)(ii).
73. Id. § 1963(e)(1).
74. Id. § 1963(e)(2).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See D. SMITH, supra note 8, § 13.04[3].
79. See Comprehensive Drug Penalty Act: Hearings on H.R. 3272, H.R.3299, and 3725
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 136
(1983) (statement of Stephen Horn, Esq., and William W. Taylor, Esq., on behalf of the Criminal
Justice Section of the American Bar Association)[hereinafter cited as Hearings](citing Armstrong
v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)) The right to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner." Id. Due process concerns become especially acute in ex parte
orders. See United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1325 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
406 (interim ed. 1985).
80. See Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1326.
81. Id.
82. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985 (Payden v.
United States), 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(quoting H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1, 19 n.1 (1984)). "The Committee, therefore does not resolve the conflict in
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explore these concerns and left the issues to be resolved by the courts.
The last. of the procedural amendments dealt with post-conviction
hearings83 held to resolve the claims of third parties to forfeited property." At such hearings, a petitioner must prove either that his interest
in the property was superior to that of the defendant at the time of the
act giving rise to forfeiture85 or that he is a bona fide purchaser who
had no reason to believe the property was subject to forfeiture. 6 Third
parties are prevented from intervening prior to the completion of the
trial under section 19630).8"
The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act exponentially increased the
government's potential for obtaining criminal assets. However, this
metamorphized RICO increased the power of government prosecutors
to such an extent that it may have taken the figurative scales of justice
out of equipoise. Courts, in response, can restore balance through interpretation of the sixth amendment right to counsel and the fifth amendment right to a fair trial.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Sixth Amendment Concerns: Right to Counsel of Choice

The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witness in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." 88
In Powell v. Alabama,89 the Supreme Court held that assistance
of counsel is one of the fundamental rights within the meaning of the
due process clause as well as an "immutable principle of justice."9 ° The
Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the sixth amendment's
guarantee of the right to counsel requires that defendant be permitted
to obtain counsel of his own choosing in all circumstances.9 1 Lower
the district court opinions on the use of restraining orders that impinge on a person's right to
retain counsel in a criminal case." Id.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (Supp. I1 1986).
84. Id. § 1963(m)(2).
85. Id. § 1963(m)(6)(A).

86. Id. § 1963(m)(6)(B).
87. Id. § 1963(j). This provision stems from the fact that third parties may not generally
intervene in a criminal case. Furthermore, while civil suits are undesirable because of the vast
amount of time consumed, the constitution nevertheless recognizes higher values than efficiency.
See Hearings, supra note 80, at 53.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
89. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
90. Id. at 71-72, (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1897); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
91. The Powell Court came the closest to addressing this issue: "It is hardly necessary to
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courts have recognized a qualified right to secure counsel of one's own
choosing, 92 arising from the need to preserve the "basic trust between
counsel and client, which is the cornerstone of the adversary system."9 3
This right remains qualified, however, because courts want to prevent
the defendant from using a sixth amendment claim for diversion and
delay. 94 Courts generally use a test balancing the defendant's right to
secure a counsel of his own choice against the state's interest in the
orderly and efficient administration of justice. 95
Fee forfeiture has a dampening effect on this qualified right to
counsel of choice in two distinct contexts: the ability of the defendant
to exercise free choice where a pre-trial restraining is issued and the
willingness of a defense attorney to accept a RICO case where there is
the threat of forfeiture.
1. The Effect of Pre-trial Restraining Orders on Defendants' Qualified Right to Counsel
Restraining orders prevent a defendant from transferring assets
which the government has shown to be potentially subject to forfeiture.9" When the restraining order goes so far as to reduce the the defendant to the status of "pauper," 97 he is unable to pay an adequate
attorney of his own choice. 98
This restraint has been criticized on the premise that the defendant is deprived of the ability to stage a vigorous defense.9 9 In some
situations, a jury can find a defendant guilty under RICO but need not
subject his assets to forfeiture at the post-trial hearing. But where a

say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to
secure a counsel of his own choice." Powell, 287 U.S. at 53.
92. See, e.g., Urqhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984).
93. Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982);
see also United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1072-73 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 951 (1984) (acknowledged defendant's interest in retaining a counsel in whom he previously
enjoyed continuous success).
94. See Urqhart, 726 F.2d at 1319.
95. See Linton, 656 F.2d at 209; see also United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 106 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983).
96. See supra notes 58-83 and accompanying text.
97. Lewis. 759 F.2d at 1326 (1985) ("The list of property seized appears to be a thorough
catalogue of [defendant's] holdings: eight parcels of land, two cars, a truck, a boat and assorted
furniture."). Cf. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986)(virtually all of
defendant's assets held forfeitable).
98. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1326 ("Given his limited financial means and breadth of assets restrained by the district court, we can only conclude that [defendant] was stripped of most of his
assets and would have been severely hampered in his ability to pay his chosen counsel.").
99. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (D. Colo. 1985). Defendants
argued that the "threat of forfeiture ... prevents them from using their assets to secure counsel
of their choice. If counsel cannot be paid, they will not work and the clients suffer."). Id.
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defendant is subject to a restraining order depriving him of access to
his assets and the order effectively precludes him from retaining counsel of choice then the defendant has been deprived of his rights to stage
an adequate defense.
Proponents of the 1984 amendments argue that court-appointed
counsel can provide adequate representation 0 " and that the mere possi-

bility that assets paid to a counsel are proceeds of racketeering activity
justifies denial of defendant's qualified right to counsel of choice. 10'
Several courts and commentators have responded that counselors

appointed under the public defender system lack the skills and re-

sources necessary for a RICO case. 02 In United States v. Rogers, 03 a

federal district court opined that it "pays no more than lip service" to
the constitutional guarantee and "ignores the exigencies of RICO

cases," which require "the marshalling of facts and information of vast
quantities perhaps constituting the whole of several worldwide business
enterprises.' ' 104 Furthermore, some fear that the public defender system
simply does not have the resources to handle the increased demand for
05
their services.1
When a RICO defendant is stripped of the ability to retain counsel of his own choice, he has no guarantee of an adequate alternative.
So long as the possibility exists that the defendant will not be convicted
or even that the defendant's assets will not be held subject to forfeiture,
denying his right to counsel competent to handle a RICO case affronts
sixth amendment guarantees.

100. See United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984)(order restrained everything but the "necessities of life"); Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849 n.14; United States v. Bello, 470
F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
101. Payden. 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14 ("Fees paid to attorneys cannot become a safe harbor from forfeiture of the profit of illegal enterprises."). The court in Payden was motivated by an
article entitled Lawyers Called Organized Crime 'Life Suppibrt', N.Y.L.J., March II, 1985, at I,
col. 2, which discussed the Report of the President's Commission on Organized Crime and stated
that "[a] small group of lawyers have become a 'critical element in the life support system of
organized crime.'" Id.
102. See, e.g., Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349; see also Krieger and Van Dusen, supra note
15, at 739 ("[R]eplacing the privately retained counsel with the conveniently appointed lawyer
from the Public Defender's Office is not a substitution in kind.").
103. 602 F. Supp 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
104. Id. at 1349. A good example of a long RICO trial occurred in United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). "This case was filed more than five years ago, and the
defendant's trial and appeals may take several years more." Id. at 1384. See also Brickey, supra
note II, at 520 n. 112 ("The courts reference to the expertise of public defenders echoes a selfserving suggestion forwarded by the criminal defense bar that an elite cadre of lawyers are
uniquely qualified to represent defendants in complex criminal litigation such as RICO and
CCE.").
105. See Bamberger, supra note 15, at A 30, col. 3 ("At the the present time, annual
budgets allocated to Federal defender offices are inadequate to pay for the lawyers and other
resources necessary to handle the massive litigation in these cases.").

Published by eCommons, 1986

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

2. The Effect
Attorneys

of Threatened

Forfeiture on

Criminal

[VOL. 12:3

Defense

Several problems arise when a lawyer accepts a case in which his
fees are potentially forfeitable. First, the fee arrangement resembles a
contingent fee when securing his fee depends on a not-guilty verdict for
his client or a finding that the fee is not part of the forfeitable assets.106
Contingent fee arrangements in criminal cases are prohibited by the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility because of the ethical
problems created in the attorney-client relationship.10 7 Some fear that
RICO defense attorneys representing a client whose guilt is in doubt
may be tempted to plea bargain for offenses in which forfeiture is not
an issue in order to protect their fees.'
The interest of the RICO defense attorney in securing his fees can
lead to further ethical dilemmas. The attorney may avoid acquiring information about the assets or the case itself in order to remain ignorant
of any taint on the property and thus qualify as a bona fide purchaser.' ° 9 Moreover, in attempting to show that he was "reasonably
without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture," an
attorney may be tempted to disclose during post-trial hearings confidential information otherwise protected by the attorney-client
privilege. 110
Courts do not look favorably on attorneys who place themselves in
such conflicts."' However, while no lawyer should involve himself in a
case where there exists a potential conflict of interest," 2 conflict is inevitable whenever forfeiture is possible. Thus, when a RICO defendant is
able to find an attorney who will accept a case knowing that his fees
are contingent upon success, the defendant's right to effective counsel is

106.

See. e.g., Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196; see also ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE

CITY OF NEW YORK COMMITTEE

ON CRIMINAL ADVOCACY, THE

ISSUE OF SUBPOENAS UPON

LAWYERS IN CRIMINAL CASES BY STATE AND FEDERAL PROSECUTORS: A CALL FOR IMMEDIATE

REMEDIAL ACTION app. 9 n.78 30-31 (1985), cited in Comment, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees
Under RICO and CCE, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1177 n.66 (1986). "[L]aw firms cannot survive if fees for big criminal cases are contingent on success, where there is a 90% conviction
rate.").
107. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(c) (1979) ("A lawyer shall
not .
collect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in criminal case."); Badalamenti,
614 F. Supp. at 196 (citing DR 2-106(c)).
108. See Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-97.
109. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (E.D. Va 1986); Badalamenti,
614 F. Supp. 196; Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348-49. For a discussion of the "bona fide purchaser"
exception, see supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
110. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1197.
III. Badalamenti. 614 F. Supp. at 196 ("A lawyer who was so foolish, ignorant, beholden
or idealistic as to take the business would find himself in inevitable positions of conflict.").
112. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101, 5-103.
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impinged upon since the attorney's representation may conflict with the
client's interests.
Any lawyer would hesitate to take on a RICO defense if he had to
wait for a post-trial hearing to know whether or not he will be compensated. Few lawyers can feel secure about their abilities to prove their
ignorance of the nature of their client's assets.' " As one court commented, "No one is more on notice of likelihood that the money [paid
to the attorney] may come from prohibited activity than the lawyer
who is asked to represent the defendant in the trial of the indictment."" 4 This challenge may become insurmountable when the prosecutor includes a broad list of assets in the indictment and informs
de5
fense counsel that he is on notice as to the nature of his fees."
Realizing the effect that threatened forfeiture has on defense attorneys, several courts have refused to extend the amendments to legal
fees." 6 In United States v. Rogers," 7 defense attorneys contested a restraining order, asking the federal district court to exclude their fees
from frozen assets. The district court found persuasive the argument
that the threatened forfeiture had a chilling effect on the defendants'
sixth amendment rights because it "prevent[ed] them from using their
assets to secure counsel of their choice. If counsel cannot be paid, they
will not work and the clients suffer."" 8
While some commentators have criticized the Rogers decision as
being overly favorable to defense attorneys," 9 the majority of later decisions have reached the same conclusion. In United States v. Badalamenti,"10 another federal district court held that "the liability to forfeiture of bona fide legal fees paid to the indicted defendant's trial
attorney would raise such constitutional and ethical problems [that it
could not] conceive that this was intended by Congress."'' Moreover,
the court pointed out that if Congress had such an intent, then the
forfeiture provision would probably violate the sixth amendment." 2

113. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) states that a third party has the burden of showing that he is is a
bona fide purchaser who had no reason to believe the property was subject to forfeiture. See supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
114. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196.
115. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1197.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1317 (D. Md. 1986);
Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1195.
117. 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
118. Id. at 1348.
119. See, e.g., Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849-50 n.14; Brickey, supra note 11, at 533 (claiming that this refusal by members of the private defense bar is "constitutionally irrelevant").
120. 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
121. Id. at 196.
122. Id. The Badalamenti court was not concerned with the situation where the defendant
is able to claim indigency and secure court-appointed counsel. Instead, the court was fearful of the
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In response to such decisions, the Justice Department issued a se-

ries of guidelines for the United States Attorneys' Offices.'2 3 To answer
judicial concerns that the ease and probability of fee forfeiture would
discourage lawyers from taking on RICO defenses, the Justice Department permitted the government to pursue legal fees only "where there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the attorney had actual knowl-

edge that the asset was subject to forfeiture at the time of the
transfer."' 24
Although the guidelines theoretically afford greater protection for
legitimate attorneys' fees, they nonetheless support the proposition that
in some cases forfeiture of attorney's fees is constitutionally permissible, and they have not been judicially accepted as a remedy for ensuring the defendant's right to choice of counsel. 2 5 One court even utilized the guidelines to support a conclusion that the third-party

forfeiture provision restricts a defendant's ability to obtain counsel of
choice.

26

Furthermore, any prosecutor can still avoid the Justice De-

partment's restrictions by simply listing the assets in the indictment.
Thus, the guidelines issued by the Justice Department are not likely to
encourage defense lawyers to accept RICO cases.
Some courts have held that the defendant's qualified right to se-

cure a counsel of his own choice is not violated even when a restraining

situation where the defendant is wealthy and cannot find counsel who will accept his retainer. In
that case, the defendant "can get neither a paid lawyer, nor a free one. . . . The problem is the
unlikelihood of obtaining a lawyer at all." Id. at 197.
Other decisions supporting the exclusion of legal fees from the reach of the forfeiture amendments include United States v. lanniello, 621 F. Supp. 1455 (S.D. 1985); Reckmeyer, 631 F.
Supp. at 1191 (forfeiture of bona fide attorneys' fees violate the defendant's qualified right to
retain counsel of choice); and Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1316 ("Despite the legal profession's commitment to pro bono work, it is doubtful that attorneys would be willing to invest the many hours
of legal work necessary to defend against these serious charges without a more substantal hope of
renumeration than the government is willing to concede.").
123. See Justice Department Guidelines on Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees, 38 CRIM. L. REP.
3001 (1985)[hereinafter Guidelines]; PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES, supra
note 8, § 13.04(1) (the guidelines were drawn primarily as an attempt to deal with the criticism
that surfaced after the Badalamenti decision). Specifically, the Guidelines overruled Rogers,
Badalamenti, and lanniello. See Guidelines, supra, § 9-111.210, at 3001-02.
124. Guidelines, § 9-11 .430, at 3004. "Reasonable grounds exist for believing that an attorney has actual knowledge that an asset is subject to forfeiture when there is evidence that it
was known to the attorney at the time of transfer either: (a) that the government had asserted
that the particular asset is subject to forfeiture, or (b) that the particular asset in fact is from
criminal misconduct." Id. § 9-111.510, at 3004. In addition, actual knowledge will be established
by the restraining order or the specific description in the indictment. Id. § 9-111.511, at 3004-05.
Forfeiture may also be pursued "where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the transfer is a fraudulent or sham transaction designed to shield from forfeiture assets which otherwise
are forfeitable." Id. § 9-111.410, at 3004.
125. See, e.g., Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1308; Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1191.
126. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1196 (citing Guidelines. supra note 124, at 3002).
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order has left him virtually indigent, since the court may appoint an
attorney for the defendant under the Criminal Justice Act. 2 7 The Act
permits a court to pay an attorney a maximum rate of $60.00 per hour
for time in court and $40.00 per hour for time outside the court
room. 12 8 This is hardly adequate considering the substantial resources
required to prepare and defend RICO cases. Moreover, the Act grants
attorney compensation only to defendants who cannot afford to retain
counsel. 12 9 Since defendants whose assets have been made subject to a
temporary ex parte seizure are not yet eligible to be declared indigent,
the Act does not apply and these defendants are left without any representation at the post-seizure hearing.'
3. Assessment of Whether the Right to Retain a Particular Counsel
Outweighs the Public's Interest in the Efficient Administration of
Justice
The final analysis of whether a defendant is deprived of his sixth
amendment qualified right to choice of counsel depends on balancing
the public's interest in the prompt, effective, and efficient administration of justice against the individual defendant's interest in selecting his
own attorney.' 3' Careful scrutiny has led at least one court to conclude
that "there is no legitimate countervailing government interest which
32
would be served by the forfeiture of bona fide attorney's fees.'
First, the purpose of the forfeiture provision is to separate the
racketeer from his economic base.' 33 Excluding legitimate attorneys'
fees from forfeiture would not enable the defendant to retain control
over the tainted assets, since payment of fees would be an arm's length
transaction and "not as part of an artifice or sham."'3 " While one can
argue that defendant should nonetheless be denied the benefit of illicit
funds in retaining expensive counsel, 33 a countervailing argument can
be made that the nature of the adversarial system is such that the defendant should be able to have the most skilled advocate to participate

127. 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(d)(1) (Supp. Iii 1985)
128. Id.
129. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1197 n.3.
130. Cf. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1325 ("If the temporary restraining order freezes the defendant's assets, additional hearings are unavailing because the defendant's ability to pay counsel has
already been foreclosed.").
131. Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied., 454 U.S. 1162
(1982); United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1069 (1978).
132. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1196.
133. See supra text accompanying note 22.
134. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348, cited in Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1196.
135. see supra text accompanying note 21.
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in his behalf.' 86
Furthermore, the right to secure one's own counsel does not conflict with administrative efficiency; instead it reduces inefficiency and
delay. ' 7 If the prospect of forfeiture causes chosen attorneys to withdraw from cases, the result is delays, trial disruption, and further encumbrances on the public defender system." 8
Finally, the decision to exclude legitimate attorneys' fees from forfeiture fees has been held to be consistent with legislative intent.1 3 9 According to the House Judiciary Committee Report, the amendments
were not intended to interfere with a person's sixth amendment right to
counsel; in fact, the Committee refused to resolve the conflict in the
district courts concerning the effect of restraining orders on a person's
right to retain counsel.' 0 As one court put it, "Congress intended, not
to resolve the sixth amendment conflict through this legislation, but to
leave the resolution of these issues to the courts."'" Although the
guidelines are based upon a conviction that forfeiture of attorneys' fees
can be constitutionally valid,'' the guidelines have neither the force of
law nor of judicial interpretation since the Department of Justice is
neither a legislative nor a judicial body.
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Concerns: The Effect of Forfeiture
on the Adversarial System
Forfeiture of attorneys' fees creates a disturbance in the equilibrium between the prosecution and the defense. The 1984 amendments
give prosecutors a significant advantage in allowing them to affect the
quality of representation for a defendant,' 3 an advantage which violates a central due process principle requiring a "balance of forces between [the] accused and the accuser. '
The court in United States v. Rogers addressed this issue:
"The interpretation of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984
suggested by the government would undermine the very principles under-

136. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1350. But see, Payden. 605 F.Supp. at 853.
137. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1196-97. "Subjecting attorney's fees to forfeiture is more
likely to impede, rather than advance, the orderly administration of justice." Id. at 1196.
138. See Bamberger, supra note 15, at A30, col. 3.
139. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197.
140. H.R. Rep. No. 845, pt. 1, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 19 n.1 (1984).
141. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14.
142. See Guidelines, supra note 129, § 9-111.210 at 3002.
143. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1197. The relation back section, "as construed and applied by the government, will deprive a defendant of counsel of choice no less effectively than if
the government simply prohibited a defendant from hiring a lawyer." Id. at 1196.
144. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973), cited in Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp.
at 1197 & Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1350.
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lying the adversary system. The government would possess the ultimate
tactical advantage of being able to exclude competent defense counsels
as it chooses. By appending a charge of forfeiture to an indictment under
RICO, the prosecutor could exclude those defense counsels which he felt
to be skilled adversaries .... Due process cannot tolerate even the opportunity for such abuse of the adversary system.' 5
Forfeiture compromises the defendant's right to stage an adequate
defense when a restraining order has frozen all of the defendant's assets. Neither a court-appointed public defender nor CJA rate-compensated counsel are given the financial resources necessary to match the
resources available to prosecute a RICO case. 1" Defendants deprived
of the assets necessary to mount a successful defense are punished
before conviction,' 47 thereby threatening the foundations of our criminal justice system-"the adversary system, the presumption of innocence and the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel. ' 41 8
As the Rogers court noted, the forfeiture amendments provide
great potential for prosecutorial abuse.' 4 9 By sending attorneys notices
of an expensive list of all assets which might possibly found to be forfeitable, the prosecutor imputes actual knowledge to the defense attorney and deprives him of the chance to prevail in the post-trial hearing,
even where the defense attorney would otherwise have had no reason to
believe that his fees would come from tainted property.' 50 Furthermore,
prosecutorial abuse can arise through inconsistent use of the forfeiture
provisions against defense attorneys."'
Erosion of the adversarial system is an almost certain result of the
prosecutorial tilt of the 1984 amendments to forfeiture. Defense Attorneys are often caught in a catch-22 situation when forfeiture of fees is
possible; their ability to handle the case effectively and fairly is
threatened. This constraint should not be tolerated since our system of
justice depends on defense attorneys who are not hindered in presenting
a "complete and exuberant" defense.' 52

145. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1350.
146. See Bamberger, supra note 15, at A30, col. 2 ("The assignment of counsel without
adequate resources implicates far more than a particular defendant's right to choose an attorney.
What would be at stake is the right to competent, well-prepared attorneys for all clients of the
Federal defender system." ).
147. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1316-17.
148. Legal Fees: Crime Law Amendments Urged, 72 A.B.A.J. July 1, 1986, at 81.
149. 602 F. Supp. at 1350. See Moscarion, Are Prosecutors Invading the Attorney-Client
Relationship, 71 A.B.A.J. Sept. 1, 1985, at 38, 40.
150. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1197.
151. See Guidelines. supra note 130, § 9-111.230, at 3003.
152. United States v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 132, 136 (3d Cir. 1979).
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C. Solutions
Supporters of the forfeiture amendments object to allowing defendants to use illegally obtained assets to retain highly skilled legal
counsel. This possibility has led some courts to argue that RICO defendants should receive no better treatment than do truly indigent
defendants."
However, these courts fail to address one crucial fact with respect
to criminal forfeiture: The government has no legal or equitable interest in property for which forfeiture is sought until the owner is found
guilty of a RICO violation.154 Without such an interest, the government should not deny defendant's right to transfer assets to pay legitimate attorneys' fees. The defendants' constitutional rights to counsel of
choice and to a fair trial through zealous representation simply outweigh fears that profits from illegal activity may be used to procure
counsel of such remarkable expertise as to give the defendant a possible
advantage over the prosecution.
Supporters of the forfeiture amendments have proposed several alternatives to remedy the problems inherent in the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act. The Department of Justice suggests that an attorney
should be permitted, with prior approval of the Assistant Attorney
General, to enter into an agreement exempting from forfeiture assets
transferred as legal fees if: (1) "there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the particular asset is not subject to forfeiture; and (2) the asset is
transferred in payment of legitimate fees for legal services actually rendered or to be rendered." 1 55 This provision is of no help to defense attorneys when the government restrains all of the defendant's assets. It
has also been suggested that a pretrial hearing regarding fee forfeiture
would effectively safeguard constitutional rights. 5 At such a hearing,
the defendant's right to counsel would be weighed against the government's interest in preserving the assets for potential forfeiture. 5 While
this approach might help resolve the issue of prosecutorial abuse,' 58 the

153. See Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849 n.14, cited in D. SMITH, supra note 8, § 13.04(2)
("Judge Edelstei.n's position was that a defendant has no right to retain counsel with tainted
funds. If necessary, he would compel the defendant to seek help from the public defender .... ").
154. United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 250 (E.D. Cal. 1982)(before government
retains title in the restrained property, the defendant must be found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt).
155. See Guidelines, supra note 124, § 9-111.700, at 3008. This provision, however, fails to
mention exactly when this agreement could take place. Id.
156. Comment, Forteiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO & CCE, 54 FORDHAM L. REV.
1171, 1185 (1986). The author also argues that this procedure would deter prosecutorial abuse by
preventing frivolous forfeiture counts in the indictment. Id. at 1185 n.134.
157. Id. at 1185.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
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possibility of fee forfeiture would remain and might dissuade defense
lawyers from taking on RICO defenses. The best solution to alleviate
fifth and sixth amendment concerns however, may be to segregate a
portion of the defendant's assets to be used by him solely for legitimate
legal fees. 59 The court could act as an equitable trustee over the defendant's assets during the trial proceeding and as such could modify
even a pretrial restraining order freezing all of the defendant's
assets.'60
Critics of this proposal argue that forfeiture provisions are
mandatory and therefore courts have no authority to release assets so
obtained. 6 ' However, Congress explicitly granted to the courts the prerogative to "consider factors bearing on the reasonableness of the order
sought. ' ' 2 Therefore, as long as assets were transferred for the payment of legitimate legal fees- which are reasonable means to protect a
defendant's constitutional rights- the court would have the authority
to protect the transaction.
In the final analysis, all interests are protected by segregation of
assets to pay legal fees. The defendant receives effective representation,
his attorney receive adequate compensation, the government still has
control of the defendant's alleged ill-gotten gains and the public enjoys
a more efficient adversarial system of justice.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In an attempt to attack the economic base of organized crime,
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, which expanded
the procedural and substantive power of the government to secure forfeiture of criminal assets. Although the end is certainly legitimate most
courts considering forfeiture of attorneys' fees have concluded that the
means to secure that end fails to pass constitutional muster, affronting
defendant's rights to counsel under the sixth amendment and to a fair
trial within our adversarial system of justice.
Scott R. Jennette

159.
160.
161.

Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1351.
Id. (citing United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 247 n.16 (E.D. Cal. 1982)).
United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 811-12 (1980), cited in A. WHITE, L. JOSEPH,
D. WATSON, & J. YENOVSKAS, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT: A
MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (1985).
162. See S. REP. No. 984-225, at 203.
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